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JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018

TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON B-1
ISSUES, JULY 22, 2008

REF: A. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE - "THE SITUATION
RESULTING FROM U.S. ACTIONS INVOLVING
CONVERSION OF B-1" - DATED FEBRUARY 15
2008 (E-MAILED TO WASHINGTON -- NO
REPORTING CABLE)

[1](#)B. STATE 13656 (JCIC-DIP-08-001)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-012.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: July 22, 2008
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the Russian Mission on July 22, 2008, to discuss B-1 issues. All Parties were present. On the issue of B-1 conversion, the Russian Delegation presented points centering on paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol. Specifically, the Russian Delegation questioned whether the United States had sufficiently fulfilled the Treaty requirements to: 1) modify all the weapons bays equipped to carry nuclear armaments so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments and, 2) remove or modify all external attachment joints for nuclear armaments and all external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. The Russian Delegation stated that Russia proceeded on the idea that a B-1 heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA, once converted to a B-1 heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, would be incapable of "carrying" nuclear armaments. The U.S.

Delegation assured all Parties that the conversion activities involving B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments were in full compliance with the START Treaty.

¶4. (S) On the issue of B-1 Basing, the Russian Delegation presented points centered on the Treaty definition of "airbase" and on the requirements of paragraph 23 of Article V of the Treaty. The Russian Delegation did not understand how the United States was able to: 1) base the converted B-1s at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB) C or E Facility since it was not an "airbase," as defined in the Definitions Annex of the Treaty, or 2) base the converted B-1s at Dyess AFB, since Parties were not allowed to base heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA at the same facility. The Russian Delegation stated that all heavy bombers must be based at an airbase, and sought an answer to the question of where the converted bombers were actually based.

¶5. (S) The U.S. Delegation stated that the Treaty did not prohibit locating heavy bombers at a conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers and, in fact, the United States had been providing notification of heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan AFB C or E Facility since the Treaty entered into force. The converted B-1s were accountable in the MOU as being located at Davis-Monthan AFB C or E Facility and those converted B-1s located at Dyess AFB were visiting, as notified by the United States through the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC).

WHEN WAS CONVERSION
NOT CONVERSION

¶6. (S) Koshelev opened the HOD Meeting by passing the condolences of the Russian Delegation to the United States on the loss of the B-52 near Guam on July 20, 2008. He stated that it was truly a tragedy when loss of life was concerned. Taylor thanked Koshelev for his statement of condolence for the loss of life in the accident. Moving on to the issue of B-1 conversion, Koshelev stated that the Russian Federation paid particular attention to the conversion of the B-1s since the number of warheads attributed to the non-converted B-1 was different from that of a converted B-1. During the intersession, Russia had sent the United States its concerns through diplomatic channels and had conducted a thorough Treaty analysis of the issue. He believed that analysis of the Treaty, relative to heavy bomber conversion, would help the United States understand Russian concerns.

¶7. (S) Koshelev stated that, to consider the B-1 converted to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all of the requirements of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the C or E Protocol had to be met. Specifically, the United States was required to: 1) modify all the weapons bays equipped to carry nuclear armaments so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments and, 2) remove or modify all external attachment joints for nuclear armaments and all external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. Russia questioned whether the United States had sufficiently fulfilled these requirements. Most important to Russia was that a B-1 heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA converted to a B-1 heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments would be incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. Koshelev stated that the Russian specialists, who attended the Distinguishability Exhibition for the converted B-1, did not believe the United States demonstrated any distinguishing features that prevented the carrying of nuclear armaments and, thus, Russia was not convinced the converted B-1s were incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. To be sufficient to confirm conversion, the conversion procedures and the distinguishing features must convince Russian inspectors that both the weapons bays and the external pylon attachment joints were incapable of physically carrying nuclear armaments.

¶18. (S) Koshelev remarked that Russia believed that to meet the intent of the C or E Protocol, all modifications made to convert the B-1 to a non-nuclear heavy bomber had to be permanent and irreversible. Since the issue was highly technical in nature, the Russian Delegation had produced a briefing that experts would present at the working group level.

¶19. (S) Taylor stated that the United States had reviewed the Russian Federation's Aide-Memoire, of February 15, 2008, on "The Situation Resulting from U.S. Actions Involving Conversion of B-1 Heavy Bombers" and assured the Russian Federation that the conversion activities involving the B-1 heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments were in full compliance with the START Treaty (Ref A). The conversion procedures used to convert the B-1 heavy bomber from the category of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (LRNA) to the category of heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments fully satisfied the requirements of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the C or E Protocol. He continued by stating that the B-1 pylon attachment joints would be converted in a manner which precluded the attachment of the long-range nuclear ALCM pylon posts with the pylon attachment joints. The nuclear-unique collet receptacle would be removed from each pylon attachment joint and a metal sleeve would be welded on the inside of the aft attachment joint well. A new fitting would be placed in the forward joint that would not allow for attachment of the long-range nuclear ALCM pylon.

¶110. (S) As for the weapons bays, Taylor stated that conversion in the B-1 weapons bays involved the removal of the two nuclear armament-unique cable connectors from each of the three weapons bays and covering the connector location. These conversion procedures rendered the converted B-1 heavy bombers incapable of carrying nuclear armaments in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the C or E Protocol.

¶111. (S) Taylor stated that the phrase "incapable of carrying," in its ordinary meaning, as well as in the context of the C or E Protocol, meant that, with respect to the modifications carried out on the pylon attachment joints and in the weapons bay, the converted B-1 heavy bomber was no longer capable of, or suited for, the operational deployment of nuclear armaments. Further, it was clear in both the Russian and English language texts that the phrase "carrying nuclear armaments" did not mean simply the ability to load or to hold an object the size and weight of a nuclear weapon. The criterion of capability or suitability to support the operational use of the nuclear armaments, as being inherent in the phrase "incapable of carrying nuclear armaments," was consistent with the meaning of "carry" as used in the START Treaty.

¶112. (S) Taylor stated that, with regard to the Russian Delegation statement that the Russian Federation could not agree to the U.S. conversion procedures for the B-1 heavy bomber, it was for the Party conducting the conversion to determine the conversion procedures used. There was no Treaty requirement to agree on additional conversion procedures other than those in Section VI of the C or E Protocol. Taylor directed Koshelev to the procedures, as stated in paragraph 11 of Section VI of the C or E Protocol, to answer his rhetorical question on what procedures were required and what procedures were enough for conversion.

¶113. (S) Taylor reiterated that the United States was very clear as to the procedures it used for converting the B-1 to the non-nuclear category. As to Koshelev's comment on the distinguishing features of the converted B-1, Taylor stated that the distinguishing features were demonstrated at the Distinguishability Exhibition and that, during future Data Update inspections, Russian inspectors would be able to confirm that the conversion procedures were still in place. He stated that the U.S. Delegation did not understand what more could be done to clarify the issue. Taylor concluded discussion of this issue by agreeing to send it to a working

group; however, he said he did not believe that anything more could be accomplished at that level of discussion.

JUST WHEN YOU THOUGHT IT WAS
SAFE TO GO INTO THE WATER

¶14. (S) Shevtsov said that this was a difficult technical issue. The Parties had talked for a long time on the definition of "process equivalent to welding." Talks were completed and agreement was finally made on the definition. Now the Parties had this issue of B-1 conversion to discuss. He opined that it would be difficult to resolve this technical issue within the days remaining in the session and he hoped discussions would not hamper completion of the Ukrainian SS-24 elimination documents.

¶15. (S) The Kazakhstani and Belarusian Delegations agreed to send the issue to a working group.

WHEN IS BASING NOT BASING?
WHEN IT IS LOCATING

¶16. (S) Koshelev stated that the Russian Federation placed the issue of basing of the B-1s on the agenda because of the creation of a new category of heavy bomber. The Russian Federation did not understand how the basing of converted B-1s fit into the requirements of paragraph 23 of Treaty Article V. Russia had expressed its concerns in the Aide-Memoire dated February 15, 2008 (Ref A). At that time only one B-1 had been converted, now 11 B-1s had been converted. Koshelev reminded the Parties that heavy bombers of certain categories could only be based at like facilities.

¶17. (S) Koshelev stated that, in terms of the Treaty, an airbase was defined as a facility where heavy bombers are based and their operations supported. Russia believed that, under the Treaty, heavy bombers could not be based at facilities other than airbases. In its May 28, 2008 response, the United States equated deployment to basing. Russia believed that this was not correct (Ref B). The Davis-Monthan AFB C or E Facility was not an airbase and, therefore, the converted B-1s could not be based there. He asked for clarification of this basing.

¶18. (S) Taylor stated that the Treaty did not prohibit locating heavy bombers at a conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers, listing them at that facility for the purposes of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and providing the appropriate notification. In fact, the United States had provided notifications concerning the location of heavy bombers at the Davis-Monthan AFB C or E Facility for heavy bombers since the Treaty entered into force, and had accurately reflected the data with respect to the applicable heavy bombers through the required notifications and periodic MOU updates. The B-1 heavy bomber, which was specified in notification ANC/STR 08-48/30, was located at Dyess AFB as a visiting heavy bomber. Because this B-1 heavy bomber was a visiting heavy bomber at Dyess AFB, it was not based at Dyess AFB. Therefore, there was no conflict with the provisions of paragraph 23 of Article V. When this particular B-1 heavy bomber completed its visit at Dyess AFB, a Format 31 would be provided.

¶19. (S) Koshelev stated that the United States had provided this same response in its May 28, 2008 paper (Ref B). He believed both the Russian questions and the U.S. responses needed clarification, which could be accomplished in a working group.

¶20. (S) Although he had no objection with sending this issue to a working group, Taylor stated that the first priority was to complete the conforming on Ukrainian SS-24 elimination.

¶21. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

¶22. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Ms. Bosco
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Fortier
Maj Gondol
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Tessier
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Mr. Smith
Mr. Brown
Mr. Edinger
Mr. Oppenheim
Mr. French (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ponamarev

KAZKHSTAN

Col Akhmetalin

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Col Akulenok
Mr. Kashirin
CAPT(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Mr. Lapshin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Serov
Mr. Smirnoff
Ms. Sorokina
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

UKRAINE

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Bodarenko
MGen. Fedetov
Mr. Demidenko

¶23. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR

NNNN

End Cable Text